

Study on the Strategies and Countermeasures of Local Migrant Workers' Wage Action

-- A Case Study Based on C Town in Northeast Henan

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Abstract

In contrast to the wage action of migrant workers, the wage action strategies of local migrant workers can be categorized as "bell-ringing", which is characterized by the purely rights-based motivation, the compromise of process, the looseness of organization, and the mildness of means. Taking the acquaintance society in which local migrant workers live as a perspective, "bell-ringing wage action" is shaped by the negative impact of verbal contracts, the principle of sentimentality of acquaintance networks, and the key role of geo-attachment. In the short term, "bell-ringing" will not endanger the order of village governance, but it may gradually evolve into irrational and violent wage action. Therefore, the government and other sectors of society need to work together to effectively protect the legitimate labor rights of local migrant workers and maintain social harmony and stability.

Keywords

Local migrant workers; "Bell-ringing wage action"; ACQUaintance society.

1. Introduction

Since the reform and opening up, with the industrial restructuring and the loosening of the urban-rural dual structure, a large group of migrant workers has emerged in China, and this has led to a series of social problems, among which the more typical one is the issue of migrant workers' wage action. Since 2003, when then-Premier Wen Jiabao demanded wages for migrant workers Xiong Deming and his wife, the Chinese government has started to pay attention to and make efforts to solve the problem of the rights and interests of migrant workers and their actions to collect wages. However, due to a variety of complex factors, infringements on the rights and interests of migrant workers, represented by defaulted wages, and the resulting actions of migrant workers to collect wages still occur today. At the same time, in recent years, due to the optimization of the urban industrial structure and the implementation of the rural revitalization strategy, as well as the impact of the natural increase in the age of the first generation of migrant workers, the urban-rural distribution of migrant workers has changed, and the proportion of local migrant workers working within the territory of the township where they are registered has continued to increase in the total number of migrant workers, and the problem of local migrant workers' wage action has come to the fore.

Since the Chinese government attaches great importance to the legal labor rights of migrant workers, academics have done a lot of research on migrant workers' wage action. As far as the strategies of migrant workers' wage action are concerned, scholars have classified them into different types based on different criteria. At the macro perspective level, Cai He divides the interest resistance behavior of migrant workers into three types: complaints within the system, collective action outside the system, and keeping silent [1]; Wang Lungang divides the

resistance behavior of migrant workers into two types: formal and informal, and focuses on the informal resistance behavior of migrant workers outside the system and its operation mechanism [2]; at the micro perspective level, Zhou Bin divides the rights defense action of migrant workers into using "weapons of the weak", self-mutilating resistance, appealing for judicial remedies, collective demonstrations, collective riots and other types [3]. In terms of the generation mechanism of migrant workers' action to demand wages, Gao Honggui takes migrant workers' "creative wage demands" as an example, and believes that the generation mechanism of migrant workers' bottom-level interest expression is the void of the political system, the awakening of civic consciousness and the new media boosted by the Internet [4]; Xu Xin believes that migrant workers' actions to defend their rights are a gradual escalation process, and focuses on the logic of "suicide for rights" [5].

On the whole, the existing studies are relatively comprehensive and have a positive effect on the understanding of migrant workers' wage action. However, in China, migrant workers are divided into migrant workers who leave their hometowns and local migrant workers who don't leave their hometowns, and existing studies have focused more on the wage action of migrant workers who leave their hometowns, and less on the wage action of local migrant workers. At the same time, field research shows that, unlike the stranger society in which migrant workers live, local migrant workers live in the vernacular society (i.e., acquaintance society), and the basic characteristics and logic of their wage action are significantly different from those of migrant workers who live abroad. Based on the case description of a local migrant workers' wage action in C town in northeast Henan, this paper focuses on the basic characteristics and generation mechanism of local migrant workers' wage action based on the analysis framework of "verbal contract, the principle of sentimentality and geo-attachment", which are unique to the acquaintance society. Based on this framework, we propose a solution to the problem of local migrant workers. On this basis, we propose a path to deal with local migrant workers' wage action, aiming to provide some reference and inspiration for the Chinese government to scientifically formulate policies to maintain rural stability and enhance the well-being of migrant workers.

2. A Local Migrant Workers' Wage Action

In December 2019 and November 2020, the authors conducted a 21-day field study on a local migrant workers' wage action in C town of Northeast Henan, using semi-structured interviews. In the study, it was found that the local migrant workers' wage action was characterized by "bell-ringing" due to the influence of the acquaintance society. In general, the development of this "local migrant workers' wage action" was as follows.

2.1. Origins of the Wage Action: Wage Action From the Contractor

At the beginning of the project, the contractor verbally promised to pay the migrant workers the previous month's wages on the 5th of each month, and this was carried out in the initial months. On July 5, 2019, the contractor began to default on the migrant workers' June wages on the grounds that the funds were not yet available, and promised to pay them on the 13th and 23rd successively, and has been delayed again and again since then. Given that the actual investor was a local, the migrant workers were then more at ease with him, believing that the actual investor could not have reneged on the payment, and therefore did not take wage action such as strikes. In early August 2019, the migrant workers had been owed wages for more than two months and began to work full-time to collect their wages.

On the morning of 7 August, one of the local migrant workers of P village called more than 30 migrant workers, as well as more than 10 local migrant workers called by their Q village friends on their behalf, to the construction site to seek wages from the contractor. The contractor confessed to the default of migrant workers' wages and acknowledged the amount of arrears,

but refused to pay the migrant workers' wages on the ground that the funds had not yet arrived. Given the negative consequences of the "big payroll" and the concerns of the actual investors, the migrant workers had to return without success. In the following days, the migrant workers were repeatedly approached by the contractor for their wages, but the contractor always delayed the payment of wages on the grounds that the funds had not yet arrived.

2.2. Development of the Wage Action: Seeking Government Help

On the morning of 13 August, more than 40 migrant workers went to the town government to reflect the problem of unpaid wages. The head of the town government summoned the contractor to the town government, but the contractor still used the excuse that the funds had not yet arrived and promised to pay the arrears of migrant workers' wages by August 20. On August 20, the migrant workers once again went to the construction site to look for the contractor to collect their wages. At this time, the contractor said that the actual investor only paid him part of the project and there was no way to settle all the workers' wages. The next day, the contractor, together with dozens of migrant workers' representatives, found the actual investor and asked him about the situation. The actual investor did not admit that the contractor had made a promise of a daily wage of 280 yuan to the migrant workers and actioned that the contractor had over-recorded the workload for the migrant workers during the construction process, an action that was also supported by the engineering project department. On August 29, the migrant workers went to the County Human Resources and Social Security Bureau to seek help. The relevant person in charge summoned the contractor to the HSS Bureau, who actioned that he had not yet received full payment for the project and naturally had no way to pay the migrant workers' wages in full. At the same time, in view of the absence of labor contracts between the migrant workers and the actual investor, as well as the influence of the actual investor in the local area, the relevant person in charge of the County Human Resources and Social Security Bureau finally could only verbally inform the contractor to pay the migrant workers' wages as soon as possible, and the contractor also promised to do so, but delayed the delivery.

2.3. The End of the Wage Action: Acceptance of the "50 Percent Wage Discount" Package

On 23 September, the migrant workers still had not received a cent of their wages and the main body of the project was nearing completion. On that day, the foreign contractor told the local migrant workers that, according to the actual investor's payment, the original promised daily wage of 280 yuan was impossible and could only be paid at the rate of 150 yuan per day, and informed the local migrant workers that they could choose to accept or sue in court. In early October, the migrant workers searched for the contractor in vain and could only find the project department to ask for an explanation. The person in charge of the project department said that according to the actual investor, the contractor had indeed over-recorded the workload, and he could only pay the migrant workers' wages on behalf of the contractor at the rate of 150 yuan per day, otherwise, the migrant workers could only find the contractor for their wages. The time cost, sunk cost, and material cost borne by the migrant workers in the process of collecting wages is enormous. As of the end of October, the migrant workers have not yet contacted the foreign contractor. With no alternative, the migrant workers had no choice but to accept the "50 percent wage discount" scheme proposed by the project department, and the matter was thus concluded.

3. Basic Features of Local Migrant Workers' "Bell-ringing Wage Action"

The term "bell-ringing" is taken from "Journey to the West", which means "being a monk for a day and ringing the bell for a day", and has connotations such as helplessness and reluctance.

In this study, "bell-ringing wage action" refers to the passive wage action taken by local migrant workers in order to recover their outstanding wages. However, due to the influence of geo-attachment, the wage action of local migrant workers is "purely rights-based", "compromising", "loosely organized" and "moderate".

3.1. The Purely Rights-based Motivation

Using the difference in motivation as a criterion, the people's collective action can be broadly classified as purely rights-based, purely profit-seeking, and rights-based-cum-profit-seeking. The local migrant workers' wage action in town C is rooted in the violation of their legal labor rights by the contractor, i.e. the contractor began to default on the migrant workers' June wages on July 5, and then after two promised payroll points on July 13 and 23, the migrant workers were still denied their wages. Due to the longer period of time without wages, the survival needs and development needs of local migrant workers could not be fully met. Under such circumstances, in order to recover the outstanding wages, local migrant workers launched a wage action in early August. At the same time, during the whole process of the wage action, the local migrant workers' interests were always to recover the wages owed to them, and subjectively they did not have the desire to seek excessive benefits, and objectively they did not expand the wage action, but kept it within a manageable range. From the above, it can be seen that, in terms of motivation, local migrant workers' wage action is only for the recovery of wages owed to them and is clearly "purely rights-based".

3.2. The Compromise of Process

Compared with the actual investor and the contractor, local migrant workers are in a weak position, and because they know that they lack strong evidence, local migrant workers' actions to collect wages are obviously compromising. For example, in the face of the repeated defaults of the contractor, local migrant workers repeatedly chose to continue to wait; in the face of the accusation of "falsification of workload" made by the actual investor, local migrant workers finally accepted it. Of course, in the midst of conflicts and contradictions, choosing compromise can effectively prevent the situation from getting out of control, and the compromising actions of local migrant workers to collect wages are most probably rational choices after rational thinking. However, this compromise is not a mutual compromise between the two sides, but a unilateral compromise of local migrant workers, which will inevitably result in the difficulty of fully protecting the legitimate rights and interests of local migrant workers.

3.3. The Looseness of Organization

According to management science, organizations must have a clear goal orientation, a well-designed structure, and consciously coordinated activities. In the case of the local migrant workers' wage action in town C, all migrant workers had a common and clear goal, namely to recover their outstanding wages. At the same time, a role similar to that of a "grassroots activist" [6] emerged among the migrant workers, i.e., the migrant workers led the class. In the whole wage action, the migrant workers' leaders are not only responsible for mobilizing other migrant workers, but also coordinating and controlling the whole wage action to ensure that it is always within the scope of the law and acceptable to the grassroots government and village elites. From this perspective, local migrant workers' wage action is somewhat organized.

In a strict sense, the wage action of local migrant workers is looser in nature. On the one hand, wage action arises more casually. Unlike migrant workers who go abroad, local migrant workers are not only responsible for wage action, but also have to undertake agricultural production tasks and handle trivial family affairs at any time. Under this circumstance, whether wage action can be generated depends entirely on whether migrant workers have common free time, and the time and membership of wage action are more variable and arbitrary; on the other hand, the binding force of the organization is limited. In the local migrant workers' wage action,

due to the lack of a hierarchical management system and written regulations on rewards and punishments, the engineering team cannot directly punish individual "free-riders" in the process of mobilizing migrant workers to participate in wage action, nor can they force individual migrant workers to participate in wage action. In addition, there is a lack of clear division of labor among the various migrant workers involved in wage action, and the loose nature of local migrant workers' wage action is prominent.

3.4. The Mildness of Means

In the course of wage action, migrant workers often resort to violent means that harm or may harm individual members physically or psychologically, such as "self-mutilation resistance", "suicide actions", "kidnapping actions", etc., in order to recover the wages owed to them. "kidnapping for wages", etc. At the same time, some migrant workers resort to "weapons of the weak" to defend their rights through moderate means. Compared with violent means, the cost and cost of moderate means are relatively low, and the negative impact is also weak, and the results of their actions are usually less desirable than those of the former. However, all means, whether violent or moderate, necessarily involve an assessment by the actors of the balance between costs and benefits, norms and conditions.

In the local collective action in town C, from the beginning to the end of the wage dispute, local migrant workers have always adhered to the policy of "neither stepping on the line nor crossing it", using a variety of moderate means to play games with the contractor, the actual investor, and the grass-roots government. First of all, they have used the means of action and assistance to enable the contractor to pay the migrant workers' wages as soon as possible. From July 5, when they were owed wages, local migrant workers negotiated and negotiated with the contractor, and on August 21, when the two sides went to the actual investor to inquire about the situation, the migrant workers even took the initiative to provide the contractor with proof of workload, hoping that the contractor could obtain and release the migrant workers' wages as soon as possible; secondly, they used such means as "guarding" and "pestering". Secondly, "guarding" and "pestering" were used to create pressure on the unpaid party, to achieve the goal of wage action. After the contractor returned to C town from Inner Mongolia, the local migrant workers took turns to "guard" him and never left him, to exert pressure on the contractor; finally, they turned to the government to intervene, hoping to solve the problem of unpaid wages. In the present case, after repeatedly seeking wages without success, the local migrant workers successively turned to the town government and the County Human Resources and Social Security Bureau. When the town government and the county human resources bureau failed to effectively solve the problem of unpaid wages due to their duties and responsibilities, the local migrant workers accepted a 50% wage discount solution. It can be found that from the beginning to the end, the local migrant workers used moderate means in their wage action.

4. The Mechanism of Local Migrant Workers' Wage Action

Against the background that "making a scene" has become the basic logic and strategic consensus of people's interest resistance [7], and that profit-seeking "making a scene" behaviors are frequent, the analysis of local migrant workers' "bell-ringing" wage action mechanism from the perspective of acquaintance society has certain positive significance for the Chinese government to scientifically formulate policies to effectively maintain the rural governance order and further improve people's welfare. In the context of the frequent occurrence of profit-seeking "big" behavior, it is of certain positive significance for the Chinese government to analyze the generation mechanism of local migrant workers' "bell-ringing wage" from the perspective of the acquaintance society, to scientifically formulate policies to effectively maintain the order of rural governance and further improve people's welfare.

4.1. Why Salary Arrears Occur: The Negative Impact of Verbal Contracts

A verbal contract is a contract reached orally between two parties without written form. In the vernacular society where local migrant workers live, a "face-to-face community" is formed between people, and a lot of information, including working hours and wages, can be explained face to face, without the need to resort to written forms [8]. At the same time, the vernacular society is a ritual society with strong interpersonal trust, and there is no need to bind each other with written contracts.

In a society where strangers are involved, the rituals of the vernacular society cannot be bound. In the construction of C town, the combination of "actual local investor + foreign contractor" has emerged, and the negative effects of verbal contracts are gradually exposed. First of all, the verbal contracts facilitate the occurrence of non-payment of wages. Since migrant workers lack sufficient evidence, the performance of verbal contracts can only be carried out through the self-performance mechanism of the contractor. When the contractor wants to obtain improper benefits, he can use reasons such as the payment for the project has not yet arrived and there are problems with the workload to refuse to pay wages; secondly, the non-payment of wages has created resentment among migrant workers. In this case, the contractor repeatedly defaulted on the wages of the migrant workers, and the migrant workers gradually developed resentment against the contractor because their interests were damaged; finally, the resentment created an opportunity for the collective action to occur, which is an important factor for the occurrence of wage action [9], and is a strong "grip" for the migrant workers to lead the class to mobilize other migrant workers to participate in wage action ".

4.2. How Wage Collectives Come to Be: The Principle of Sentimentality in the Acquaintance Society

Existing research suggests that the older the migrant workers are, the more they tend to be silent and tolerant in their attitudes towards violations. In this case, the overall age of local migrant workers is older, but their attitude towards infringement is more positive, and almost all migrant workers can participate in the wage action. The reason for this is that the principle of "friendship" in the acquaintance society of local migrant workers has effectively prevented them from taking advantage of the situation and organized all the local migrant workers with resentment into the wage action.

The reason why the principle of "favor" can overcome the "hitchhiking" mentality of local migrant workers is that in the acquaintance society, local migrant workers have the incentive to maintain "favor": first, the incentive of human capital. Local migrant workers and their family members work and live in the local area, and the convenience and change of their life and the prosperity and development of their family need favors to be facilitated and facilitated [10]. Therefore, in order to have human capital for "exchange of favors", local migrant workers need to actively respond to the mobilization of migrant workers to lead classes, so as to accumulate human capital, otherwise they will "owe favors"; second, the village community public opinion incentive. Because they live in the same village, local migrant workers form an "imaginary community", and the internal members of the "community" need to comply with the fast-growing norm of collecting wages together. When a migrant worker leads a mobilization, if a migrant worker behaves in a way that is not in line with the fast-growing norm, such as "hitchhiking" or refusing to cooperate, his or her behavior will spread rapidly among acquaintances in the form of village and community opinion, and lead to his or her and his or her family's disgrace in the local community. As a result, local migrant workers become involved in wage action out of a need to preserve their feelings, and wage action collectives are formed.

4.3. How Collective Behavior Is Shaped: The Key Role of Geo-attachment

In the face of violations, migrant workers' reactions are generally extreme, i.e., either silence, tolerance, or fierce resistance. However, the collective action of local migrant workers in town C has a different manifestation: on the one hand, under the regulation of the principle of sentimentality, migrant workers with grievances are able to organize themselves and participate in wage action; on the other hand, due to the constraints of geopolitical attachment, local migrant workers have various concerns in their wage action, and their behavior is characterized by reluctance.

People who live off the land have been settled for generations as the norm and outward migration as the exception. In this case, most local migrant workers have settled in town C for generations and have a strong geo-dependence on the village elite and the grassroots government: on the one hand, they are attached to the village elite, represented by the actual investors, for employment. Most local migrant workers are forced to return to their hometowns because of their age and lack of skills, and "odd jobs" have become the only way to improve their family situation. At the same time, rural elites have advantages in physical capital, vocational skills, and social networks, which can create and provide more employment opportunities, thus making local migrant workers attached to them. Since the local government is a public authority, local migrant workers cannot do without the help of the government in their daily production life, issuing relevant certificates, regulating daily disputes, and handling other businesses. Therefore, to seek help from the government in the future, local migrant workers dare not act in a way that touches the bottom line of the government.

In shaping the collective behavior of local migrant workers, geo-dependence plays a key role because the amount of wages owed to local migrant workers is not high. After weighing the pros and cons of "geo-dependence" and "making a big fuss over wages", local migrant workers, under the logic of self-preservation, choose to give priority to maintaining their geo-dependence to the actual investors and the grassroots government. It is true that, under the influence of geo-attachment, the small amount of unpaid wages rarely angers migrant workers and does not endanger the village governance order. However, this phenomenon is an obstacle to raising the incomes of low-income groups and to building a vibrant, harmonious, and orderly village of good governance.

5. The Countermeasures of Local Migrant Workers to "Bell-Ringing Wage Action"

In the short term, "bell-ringing" will not endanger the order of rural governance. However, as the share of wage income in the total household income of local migrant workers increases, if the problem of unpaid wages remains unresolved for a long period, "bell-ringing" may evolve into "big wage demands", etc. Therefore, to effectively safeguard the legitimate labor rights of local migrant workers and prevent the occurrence of various collective actions, this study makes the following recommendations.

5.1. Crackdown on the Collusion of Interests Between Village Elites and Grey and Black Forces

In rural societies, rural elites can use their capital, technology, and connections to obtain projects and then commit acts that infringe on the legitimate rights and interests of local workers. Therefore, on the one hand, there is a need to enrich and improve the channels for local migrant workers to express their interests. For example, consideration can be given to the implementation of off-site processing of migrant workers' wage action, and to moderately allowing local migrant workers to reflect their problems at a higher level; on the other hand, the Chinese government needs to firmly uphold the determination to "break the wrist" and

resolutely crack down on acts that violate migrant workers' labor rights and interests in rural society, and will not be soft on the collusion of interests involving grey and black forces. On the other hand, the Chinese Government needs to be resolute in its determination to crack down on violations of the labor rights of migrant workers in rural society and to take no action against collusion of interests involving grey and black forces.

5.2. Strengthening the Construction and Enforcement of Mechanisms to Protect the Labor Rights of Migrant Workers

The Chinese Government has taken great pains to solve the problem of migrant workers' difficulties in collecting wages, and every year the Premier of the State Council stresses the need to crack down on the default of migrant workers' wages. However, the phenomenon of defaulting on the payment of wages to migrant workers still exists, mainly because of the inadequate construction and implementation of the mechanism for safeguarding the labor rights and interests of migrant workers. Therefore, on the one hand, there is a need to continue to improve the mechanism for safeguarding the labor rights and interests of migrant workers. For example, the experience of the mechanism of "direct financial payment of migrant workers' wages" implemented in Xingan County of Jiangxi Province can be summarized and promoted, and the litigation procedures of migrant workers' wage action can be simplified and a simplified mechanism of legal proceedings for migrant workers' wage action can be formed; on the other hand, the implementation effect of the mechanism for safeguarding migrant workers' labor rights and interests needs to be improved. If any system or mechanism wants to play its function effectively, it must be implemented well. Therefore, it is necessary to continuously optimize the allocation of responsibilities and strengthen the construction of teams, so as to enhance the implementation effect of the mechanism for protecting the labor rights and interests of migrant workers.

5.3. Give Full Play to the Role of Social Forces in Safeguarding the Labor Rights of Migrant Workers

On the one hand, the construction of trade unions should be strengthened and their role in safeguarding the labor rights and interests of migrant workers should be brought into play. As we all know, trade unions are the representatives and defenders of the interests of Chinese workers' groups and are responsible for safeguarding the labor rights and interests of migrant workers. Therefore, it is necessary to start from the following two points to give full play to the role of trade unions in safeguarding and protecting the labor rights and interests of migrant workers: firstly, to start from economic independence and effectively enhance the independence and representativeness of grassroots trade unions, so that they can more effectively represent and protect the interests of migrant workers; secondly, to make efforts to improve the functions of trade unions, especially their functions of signing collective contracts with employers on behalf of workers; on the other hand, to strengthen the news media, we should strengthen the press and media, and give play to the role of the press in protecting the labor rights and interests of migrant workers. The news media is a typical tool of public opinion supervision, which has an important deterrent effect on the protection of labor rights and interests of migrant workers. However, some of the news media have become increasingly indifferent to the wage action of migrant workers, and even selectively blind to certain "sensitive" incidents. Therefore, it is necessary to give the news media more freedom, so that they can be independent of various interest subjects, and truly take the overall situation of social stability as the basis for humanistic concern, and objectively and fairly publicize and report on wage action.

6. Conclusion

After analyzing the theoretical framework of "verbal contract, sentiment principle, and geopolitical attachment", this paper finds that there is a specific mechanism for local migrant workers' "bell-ringing wage action", i.e., the negative impact of verbal contract enables wage arrears to occur, the principle of sentiment in acquaintance society enables collective action to be formed, and the key role of geopolitical attachment enables collective action to be shaped. The negative impact of verbal contracts allows for the occurrence of unpaid wages, the principle of sentimentality of acquaintance society allows for the formation of collective wage action, and the key role of geopolitical attachment allows for the shaping of collective action. At the same time, influenced by the vernacular society, the local migrant workers' actions to collect wages show the characteristics of "ringing the bell", which is manifested in the "pure rights defense" at the motivation level, "compromise" at the process level, and "organization" at the organization level. They are characterized by "pure rights protection" at the motivation level, "compromise" at the process level, "looseness" at the organization level, and "mildness" at the means level.

With the implementation of the new urbanization strategy, more and more local migrant workers have started to "move upstairs", and most of their contracted farmland has flowed into the hands of modern agricultural operators through such channels as trusteeship, transfer, shareholding and one-time buyout, etc. The "hidden social security" function of farmland has gradually faded, and wage income has become more and more important to the production and livelihood of local migrant workers. The "hidden social security" function of farmland is gradually fading, and the wage income is becoming more and more important to the production and living of local migrant workers, who are paying more and more attention to their labor rights and interests. Therefore, in the long run, as the status of wage income in the production life of local migrant workers increases day by day, if the Chinese government fails to take timely measures to effectively protect the legitimate labor rights and interests of local migrant workers, the "bell-ringing" behavior of local migrant workers to collect wages may turn into "a big fight to collect wages". If the Chinese government fails to take timely measures to effectively protect the legal labor rights and interests of local migrant workers, the "bell-ringing" behavior of local migrant workers may turn into a "big wage dispute". Therefore, there is a need to further safeguard the legitimate labor rights and interests of local migrant workers through measures such as cracking down on the collusion of interests between rural elites and grey and black forces, strengthening the construction and enforcement of mechanisms to safeguard the labor rights and interests of migrant workers, and giving full play to the role of social forces in safeguarding the labor rights and interests of migrant workers.

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